## Message Text

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**ACTION EUR-25** 

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAM-01 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ACDA-19 IO-14 AEC-11 OIC-04

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4350

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1131

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FEB 26 SPC DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION AND RELATED

ACTIONS

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A) STATE 036927; B) STATE 027044

SUMMARY: DUE LACK OF FRG INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH FRG REP SAID WERE NOT EXPECTED FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK, SPC COULD TAKE LITTLE ACTION ON VERIFICATION PAPER AT ITS FEB 26 MEETING. IN EFFORT TO MOVE ON ISSUES OF LESS DIRECT CONCERN TO FRG, DTUCH REP PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR SECOND SENTENCE IN PARA 19, WHICH U.S. REP AGREED TO REPORT TO WASHINGTON. SPC WILL HOLD OPEN MARCH 4 IN HOPES THAT FRG MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY. IN RELATED ACTION, U.S. AND UK DELS INFORMALLY WORKED OUT COMPROMISE FORUMLATIONS FOR PARAS 25 AND 30 WHICH BOTH AGREED TO FORWARD TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. SECRET

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ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE WITH FORMULATIONS GIVEN BELOW. END SUMMARY.

1. ASKED WHETHER FRG DELEGATION

COULD NOW AMPLIFY VIEWS MADE AT PREVIOUS MEETING, FRG REP (RANTZAU) SAID THAT BONN IS STILL STUDYING ENTIRE VERIFICATION QUESTION INTENSIVELY BUT THAT REVIEW WAS NOT YET COMPLETE. HE ASKED THE ALLIES TO UNDERSTAND THE DELAY SINCE ANY VERIFICATION PROPOSALS APPLIED ON NATO SIDE OF NGA WOULD PRIMARILY AFFECT FRG, AND THUS BONN NEEDED TO THINK THROUGH IMPLICATIONS IN GREAT DETAIL. FRG REP CONCLUDED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK.

- 2. CHAIRMAN THEREUPON PROPOSED TO HOLD OPEN MARCH 4 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION, BUT MEANTIME ASKED IF THE SPC COULD RESOLVE ANY OTHER PROBLEMS. DUTCH REP (SIZOO) PROPOSED ON PERSONAL BASIS COMPROMISE ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION
  FOR SECOND SENTENCE IN PARA 19. LANGUAGE READS: QTE THE ALLIES WILL SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTORATE TO BE ESTABLISHED TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WILL AT THE SAME TIME BE TASKED TO VERIFY, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS ON THE LIMITATIONS OF MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES. UNOTE.
- 3. DUTCH REP FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT HIS FORMULATION MEANT TO HIGHLIGHT FACT THAT ALLIES WOULD NOT SEEK A SEPARATE INSPECTION SYSTEM FOR VERIFYING STABILIZING MEASURES. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE PHRASE "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE," BUT HAD KEPT IT IN TO REMIND THOSE ALLIES WHO MIGHT WISH TOTAL AND DETAILED VERIFICATION OF ALL MEASURES OF AN AGREEMENT THAT THERE WERE OBVIOUS PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS TO WHAT ANY INSPECTORATE COULD UNDERTAKE.
- 4. U.S. REP EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR DUTCH REP'S FORMULATION AND HIS

AMPLIFYING EXPLANATION, AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT ALNGUAGE TO HIS AUTHORITIES. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALLIES SHOULD AGREE THAT THE

BASIC PURPOSE OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM IS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS AND POST REDUCTIONS FORCE LEVELS, AND THAT WHILE THE SYSTEM MIGHT ALSO SECRET

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BE TASKED WITH MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH STABILIZING MEASURES, SUCH ACTIVITY SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM ITS PRIMARY TASK.

5. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) WELCOMED DUTCH FORMULATION, ADDING THAT IT WENT FAR TO ALLAY U.S. CONCERNS. ONLY BASIC DIFFICULTY HE HAD WAS WITH THE TERM "WILL SEEK TO" WHICH HE PROPOSED TO DELETE.

HE EXPLAINED THAT ALLIES MAY WELL "SEEK TO" OBTAIN A VERIFICATION SYSTEM IN NEGOTIATIONS, ONCE ACHIEVED HOWEVER, ALLIES SHOULD AGREE THAT THEY WILL IN FACT HAVE THE RIGHT TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH STABILIZING MEASURES. HE ALSO PREFERRED TO DELETE "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE."

US. REP SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS BELGIAN REP HAD

INTENDED DUTCH FORMULATION TO BE ONLY AN INTERNAL ALLIED UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHAT INSPECTORS WOULD ACTUALLY INSPECT. BELGIAN REP VIGOROUSLY DISAGREED, AND RECALLED BELGIUM'S LONG STANDING VIEW THAT THERE BE A DE JURE RIGHT TO VERIFY STABILIZING MEASURES. IN THAT CASE, U.S. REP REPLIED, PHRASE "SEEK TO" CLEARLY HAD TO REMAIN. HE ALSO BELIEVED "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE" TO BE ESSENTIAL. DUTCH REP RECALLED THAT HE HAD DELIBERATELY KEPT PHRASE "SEEK TO" IN TO ACCOMMODATE "THOSE WHO NEEDED IT," AND THEREFORE -BELGIAN OBJECTIONS NOTWITHSTANDING - STILL WISHED TO RETAIN IT.

6. COMMENT: WE THINK DUTCH FORMULATION WITH U.S. COMMENT FOR RECORD CORRESPONDS TO WASHINGTON'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED IN PARA 2 OF REF A. BELGIAN REP'S POSITION ON PHRASE IS A FAMILIAR ONE, WE WOULD, HOWEVER, EXPECT HIM EVENTUALLY TO GO ALONG WITH ANY STRONG CONSENSUS WHICH DEVELOPS, ESPECIALLY SINCE DUTCH HAVE ALREADY DISAVOWED HIS ARGUMENT. END COMMENT

7. IN RELATED ACTION, U.S. AND UK DELS HAVE BEEN WORKING INFORMALLY DURING PAST DAYS TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE MOBILE TEAM/STATIC POSTS ISSUE (PARAS 25, 30 AND 38). WHILE BRITISH HAVE CONTINUED TO STRESS DESIRABILITY OF A COMBINED SYSTEM, WE HAVE PRESSED ARGUMENT THAT ALLIES MUST INSURE THAT THEY GET AT LEAST MOBILE TEAMS. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE DRAWN ON PARA 7 OF REF B SUGGESTING TO THE UK THAT ONCE MOBILE TEAMS ARE ACCEPTED THE ALLIES COULD THEN INTRODUCE IDEA OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATIC POSTS. UK DEL IS READY TO RECOMMEND THIS APPROACH TO LONDON, AS WELL AS OUR FURTHER ARGUMENT SECRET

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THAT PUTTING FORWARD MOBILE TEAMS IS BASED ON TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

ON LATTER POINT, UK EXPANDED IDEA SUCH THAT OVERALL APPROACH IN DESCRIBING COMPONENTS OF AN INSPECTORATE TO THE EAST WOULD BE REAGRDED AS A TACTICAL QUESTION TO BE DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF NEGOTIATIONS. ALGHOUGH THIS APPROACH DOES NOT RESOLVE PROBLEM SUBSTANTIVELY, WE THINK IT PRESERVES THE BASIC U.S. POSITION ON PRIMACY OF MOBILE TEAMS, WHILE ENABLING THE AHG TO DETERMINE HOW BEAST TO SUBMIT AN OVERT VERIFICATION PROPOSAL.

SECRET

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**ACTION EUR-25** 

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAM-01 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ACDA-19 IO-14 AEC-11 OIC-04

OMB-01 DRC-01 /162 W

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R 011100Z FEB 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4351
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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8. TEXT OF SUBSTITUTE PARAGRAPHS 25 AND 30, AS DEVELOPED BY UK DEL AND AMENDED BY US, READS AS FOLLOWS:

QTE 25.FOR THE MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A SYSTEM OF MOBILE TEAMS. STATIC POSTS AT KEY POINTS SHOULD SUPPLEMENT SUCH A SYSTEM IF POSSIBLE. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A COMBINED SYSTEM, A SYSTEM OF MOBILE TEAMS ALONE WOULD BE FAR PREFERABLE TO A SYSTEM OF STATIC POSTS ALONE. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF A COMBINED SYSTEM SHOULD BE PRESENTED TOGETHER, OR WHETHER ATTENTION SHOULD INITIALLY BE FOCUSSED ON MOBILE TEAMS, IS A TACTICAL ONE FOR ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO DECIDE. IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION.

30. FOR POST-WITHDRAWAL MONITORING, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE A SYSTEM OF MOBILE TEAMS. STATIC POSTS AT KEY POINTS SHOULD SUPPLEMENT SECRET

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SUCH A SYSTEM IF POSSIBLE. SHOULD IT PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE A COMBINED SYSTEM, THEN MOBILE TEAMS ALONE WOULD BE A VERY MUCH PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE TO STATIC

POSTS ALONE (ALTHOUGH FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW ALONE, A SYSTEM INVOLVING A REDUCED NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS WITH SOME STATIC POSTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A LARGER NUMBER OF EITHER MOBILE TEAMS OR STATIC POSTS ON THEIR OWN). THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD START BY PRESENTING A COMBINED SYSTEM AS A WHOLE OR SHOULD INITIALLY CONCENTRATE ON MOBILE TEAMS, AS THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE ELEMENT IN THE CONBINED SYSTEM, IS A TACTICAL ISSUE TO BE DECIDED IN THE LGIHT OF THE OVERALL NEGOTIATING SITUATION. UNQTE WE HAVE TOLD UK DEL THAT PARENTHETICAL STATEMENT IN PARA 30 NOT LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BY WASHINGTON.

9. UK DEL HAS AGREED TO RECOMMEND FOREGOING TO LONDON AND WE HAVE SAID WE WOULD DO LIKEWISE. BOTH DELS AGREED TO HOLD OFF ON PARA 38 UNTIL RESPECTIVE CAPITALS HAVE DECIDED ON FOREGOING LANGUAGE. CAN

WASHINGTON ACCEPT PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR PARAS 25 AND 30 OR PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE?

10. ON OTHER ISSUES WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF GERMAN POSITION. WE ARE TRANSMITTING SEPTEL FOURTH REVISION OF SPC'S DRAFT, WHICH INCORPORATES CHANGES AND NEW BRACKETS REPORTED IN USNATO 861.
RUMSFELD

SECRET

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TAGS: PARM, NATO To: STATE SECDEF INFO BONN LONDON USNMR SHAPE **VIENNA** 

SALT TWO GENEVA Type: TE

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